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COMPLETE LIST OF PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL 
The persons involved on this appeal include Appellant Dena Stewart ("Ms. 
Stewart"), and Appellee Barton Woods Homeowners Association, Inc. ("BWHOA"). 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78A-3-102(4), and 78A-4-103(2)(j) because this is a matter transferred by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: A trial court may not issue advisory opinions that adjudicate moot 
questions; trial courts must resolve active conflicts between the 
parties to litigation. BWHOA, based upon applicable homeowner's 
covenants, sued Ms. Stewart for injunctive relief requiring her to 
remedy several alterations she had made to property she owned in 
the Barton Woods Subdivision, specifically Lot 109, commonly 
referred to as 962 South Terrace Drive, Bountiful, Utah 84010 (the 
"Property"). After the lawsuit began, Ms. Stewart surrendered the 
Property in bankruptcy, and the subsequent owner voluntarily 
remedied the alterations, rendering BWHOA's complaint moot. 
Could the trial court decide BWHOA's moot complaint? Issue 
preserved at Record page 981 (transcript of December 2, 2010 oral 
argument at page 29 line 22 through page 34 line 11). 
Standard of review: The correctness of the trial court's decision not to decide a moot 
dispute is a legal question, and is reviewed for correctness. See CECO Corp. v. Concrete 
Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I 
City Corp,, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Natl Bank, 131 P.2d 
225, 229 (Utah 1987); and Scharfv. BMG Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
ISSUE NO. 2: For a court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the plaintiff must have 
standing to pursue the asserted claim. Ms. Stewart, relying upon 
rights created by the applicable homeowner's covenants and based 
upon her status as the owner of the Property, counterclaimed against 
BWHOA, alleging only two causes of action, both stemming from 
the covenants, conditions and restrictions that ran with the Property 
(the "CC&Rs"). Ms. Stewart then abandoned the Property in 
bankruptcy and admitted to the trial court that she no longer had 
standing to maintain actions based upon the CC&Rs. Could the trial 
court entertain Ms. Stewart's counterclaims after admitting that 
she had no standing? Issue preserved at Record page 981 
(transcript at page 15 line 14 through page 16 line 7, and page 17 
line 10 through page 18 line 5). 
Standard of review: The correctness of the trial court's decision not to decide a 
counterclaim in which the counterclaimant lacks standing is a legal question, and is 
reviewed for correctness. See CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 
969 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 
(Utah 1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); and 
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
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ISSUE NO. 3: A party is generally entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs 
only if she is the prevailing party and the award of fees and costs is 
permitted by either statute or contract. Although the CC&Rs allow 
for the recovery of attorneys' fees in limited circumstances, Ms. 
Stewart has not prevailed on any of her counterclaims or in 
defending against BWHOA's complaint. Could the trial court 
award attorneys 'fees to Ms. Stewart as a non-prevailing party? 
Issue preserved at Record page 981 (transcript at page 29 line 22 
through page 34 line II). 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decisions regarding the award of attorneys' fees is 
reviewed for patent error or clear abuse of discretion. See City Consumer Services, Inc. v. 
Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 240 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (see Addendum A). 
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (see Addendum B). 
3. Rules 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (see Addendum 
C, D, E, F, G, and H). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition. 
The trial court dismissed both BWHOA's complaint and Ms. Stewart's 
counterclaims because, as a result of Ms. Stewart's surrender of the Property in 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
bankruptcy, the complaint is moot and Ms. Stewart lacks standing to pursue her 
counterclaims. That is the judgment from which Ms. Stewart has appealed. 
In December 2007, BWHOA filed a complaint against Ms. Stewart seeking 
declaratory relief and an injunction requiring Ms. Stewart to remove and remedy several 
alterations to the Property that did not conform with the CC&Rs for the Barton Woods 
Subdivision. BWHOA simultaneously filed a lis pendens on the Property. 
Instead of remedying the violations, Ms. Stewart counterclaimed, alleging that 
BWHOA enforced the CC&Rs in a discriminatory and/or inconsistent fashion, and asking 
that the trial court order BWHOA to "promptly cover with brick, wood, or stucco, all 
windows and glass or metal doors, and other apertures in the exterior of all structures in 
the subdivision not now covered with brick, wood or stucco. . . ." She also claimed 
$250,000.00 from BWHOA for damages caused by alleged encroachments by neighbors 
upon the Property. 
Ms. Stewart never amended her pleadings to include any other allegations or 
causes of action, and the deadline for doing so passed on July 30, 2010. 
Instead of commencing discovery, in March 2008 Ms. Stewart filed a motion for 
summary judgment (the "First Motion for Summary Judgment"), arguing that BWHOA 
had discriminated against her or had abandoned the CC&Rs. BWHOA filed a cross 
motion for summary judgment, which was followed by Ms. Stewart filing a motion to 
strike the lis pendens. The trial court ultimately denied all of these motions, holding that 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
there were qucMions oi !<^ . e lud ing summaryjudgim m .u cmier part\. an*: 
cc f li in i lit ig tf i€ pi opi iety of tl le lis / pendens 
In January 2009, again before any discovery had been conducted, Ms . Stewart filed 
another motion for summary judgment (the "Second Motion for Summary Judgment") , 
w 1 licl i. asset ted tf i„e sat i ie ai gi n i lei its tl lat 1 lad failed i.i I tl i„e F ii st Motioi :t for Si immary 
Judgment . Before the trial court decided the Second Motioi i. for Si in imary Ji ldgi nei it., I" Is 
Stewart filed for Uiapler I ; bankruptcy protection in April 2009. On July 3 1 , _009, Lie 
trial, court denied the Second Motion, for Summary Judgment, and stayed the proceedings 
in liglil ' 'I '" K Slew.ill 's biirki 111ill >„ 
I Ills order, however , did not stop Ms . Stewart from filing an unsuccessful motion 
for reconsideration, itI which she raised for the first l ink ihe factually unsupj •;• o 
argument n,.ii •-/ h . \ nad ^oineliow uui'vcd <tii ^l n , .unis <>i muition except thnt 
• ' M I . . * - I • •• ! ' ' M i ; n ; c ,'' • ; 
On September 8, 2009, Judge R. Kimball Mosier of the United States Bankruptcy 
Coiirt for the District of I Jtah signed an uncontested order confirming Ms . Stewart 's 
CI laptei 13 bai i,,k,,,i i iptcy plai i In tl mt oi dei , Judge I"v losiei stated tl ia„t IV Is. Stew at t had 
surrendered the Property to one of her creditors. ^ 11 e r : u. .;: •. i >; i v • ' \ h . V •,.-..?-. i 
March 11. 2010. .ti m 30 a.i iu the Property was sold ai -\ ntn-judicial foreclosure sale. 
Si, >i\ u ik i liiv. .*>. c l o s u r e sale, the purchaser, or one of the purchaser ' s successors in 
i nh ' i v ^ i - -! . . -
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
After receiving an order lifting the bankruptcy stay, the trial court signed a 
stipulated case management order, which, among other things, set July 30, 2010 as the 
deadline for filing motions to amend the pleadings. July 30, 2010 passed without Ms. 
Stewart seeking any leave to amend her pleadings to add claims of wrongful lien or 
abusive litigation. 
Because of the foreclosure sale, on August 17, 2010, BWHOA filed a notice 
releasing the lis pendens. 
On August 24, 2010, even though no discovery had occurred aside from Ms. 
Stewart's production of a two-page initial disclosure statement, Ms. Stewart filed yet 
another Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Third Motion for Summary 
Judgment"). 
In response, BWHOA filed a motion to dismiss the litigation in its entirety or in 
the alternative for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that its complaint should be 
dismissed because the Property had been sold and the objectionable alterations remedied, 
mooting BWHOA's claims. BWHOA also argued that Ms. Stewart's counterclaims 
should be dismissed because, as a result of surrendering the Property in Bankruptcy, Ms. 
Stewart no longer had standing. 
On December 2, 2010, at oral argument, Ms. Stewart's counsel admitted that Ms. 
Stewart no longer had the right to seek injunctive relief or damages for encroachment. 
Record at 981 (Transcript of hearing held December 2, 2010, at page 15 line 14 through 
page 16 line 7, and page 17 line 10 through page 18 line 5) (emphasis added). 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Regarding the I hird Motion lor Summary Judgn lent, tl le trial court agreed w illi 
B W H O A, disi i lissed BW 1 10 '\ \s coi i iplaii it ai id N Is. Ste1 * > at It's coi n itei claii i i, ai id dei lie d a 
contractual award of attorney's fees and costs to Ms. S t ^ w u i . K. a. J 8 I (transcript at 
page 29 line 22 through page 34 line 11) A nd It !•• frc ' h \ decision i lot froi i I ai i> of 
tl le otl lei dei lials of si in n i lai y ji idgi i ie;t it tl lat I \ Is. Stewai t appealed. 
I hus, the issues as presented In Ms. Slewarl are nol. and i.mnoi In;
 (i| pl,i\ m Mir. 
appeal. ' I he trial court 's judgment is based upon niooti less and lack of standing, not upon 
any interpretation of the CC&Rs or their history, or upon any arguments that B W H O A 
1: las ei igaged ii i ai ry type of in ipi ope i litigatioi i 
. Nevertheless, Ms. Stewart is once again in HIM u> move ioi >./ • *•; s 
the substance of the claims, this time shrouding her moihm in die guise of an appellate 
mu i. 
• K c g a r d i . . I * v • *• • • -i: . u • • ' ! - •> Ms Stew ai tl las 
no standing to pursue her counterclaims. 1 huo, the trial court's dismissal was correct and 
shoi lid be upheld. 
II. Siadn mi • ill i I I K i d s . • ' "- • 
4. Ms . Stewart is the former owner of die h e *v e e M- ,! r.> • \ 
of the Bartoi I Woods plain led i init development located ii i Davis County, Utah, and 962 
S^-. .. I eri*ace ! ) n \ e , Bountiful, I Jtah 84010. Record at 2, 56, and 64. 
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5. All lots in the Barton Woods planned unit development (the "Barton Woods 
PUD") are subject to the CC&Rs, which were originally recorded with the Davis County { 
Recorder on January 19, 1993. R. at 2-3, 9-38, 56, and 64. 
6. The CC&Rs state that restrictive covenants "shall run with the subject 
property and be binding on all parties having any rights, title or interest in that subject 
property or any part thereof, their heirs, successors and assigns, and shall inure to the 
benefit of each owner thereof." R. at 3, 13, 56, and 64. 
7. The CC&Rs give BWHOA, as the homeowners association, the power to 
"control all construction, improvements, and landscaping on the Project to ensure 
consistency and compatibility of all improvements and landscaping on the Project." R. at 
3, 19-20, 56, and 64. 
8. The CC&Rs also require "prior written approval" from the Management 
Committee of the Association before any improvements are constructed. R. at 3, 20, 56, 
and 64. 
9. Paragraph 5.3 of the CC&Rs states that "[a]ll buildings, alterations, 
improvements, additions and maintenance on the Subject Property shall be made in a 
workmanlike manner and shall be architecturally compatible with the rest of the Project." 
R. at 3, 20, 56, and 64. 
10. On April 21, 1997, BWHOA recorded amended CC&Rs ("Amended 
CC&Rs"). R. at 3, 40-46, 56, and 64. 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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11. I he \\ i :iei ided CC&Rs placed arcl litectui all conti ol o\ ei the subdiv isioi :t in a 
"Design Review Committee/ ' ' R. at 4, 40, 56, and 64. 
12. The purpose of the Des ign Rev iew Conii nit tee is to ""create, mainta in and 
improve Barton Woods Planned I Jn.it Deve lopmen t as n pleasant ~nd dc^irahV 
e:t r -• ii o:t :n i ie:i: i t , I: ::) establisl I ai id presei: ve a 1 u u n: u ):i nc )i is uesigi i !c )r i i l e < :on n i n ii: iii:;; ' ai id t ::: • 
p ro tec t and p r o m o t e the va lue o f the Proper ty , ex ter ior des ign , l andscaping .rn h.-iiiics 
(•i d ieni t ious to the exis t ing use of the Proper! v " ";: <\- i 40 . 56. and f»4. 
13 1 1 ic CC&Rs regulate the exterior of the dw ellm^N m the subdrTH~n- t t r u c 
exterioi of all bi lildii tgs v • ill be coi isti I icted of bricl :: oi :t 1:1: le f - :-i • 
being w ood, stucco and/or sucl i other materials authorized by the [Design Review 
Committee]." R d 1 17. 56. and 64. 
14 * ,,,.-. , AW ^ \ iVK > stales Uwo ' . • ,mv party governed . • die terms 
Oi tills j U v ! i n :•• • K ' s . .
 ; " • • ' J l l l f n i l . -\ 
costs and attorney's fees incurred b) anoLher part} to enlorce the provisions hereof, 
whether incurred through formal lawsuit or otherwise." R. at 16-37. 
15. , '"I| Iter pi ii chasii :ig tl ic I *i opei I:y, 1"^  Is. Ste ivai I: n: :iade a i n in ibei of 
improvemen t s to the exterior design of the house . These improvement.^ nu hided 
instal l ing dark wood si Hitters on the froi it exterior of the limine, paint ing the garage door 
o a r o f c n n brass, pa int ing the entry in ;,,. .....iK ..i.ios . . -^ i S iiia>, installing or paint ing 
t i i r l n > m r \ 4*1111» .idi' m . n l h i p d \\l dm iu n b r a s s , a d d in1.1 illdi!', l o ck . o i l pot t i c i «>l d'«" 
front exterior walls oi the home. R. at -1, 5 7, 03, and 87. 
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{ 
16. None of these improvements were approved by the Design Review 
Committee before taking place. R. 4, 57, and 65. { 
17. On October 30, 2007, pursuant to paragraph 4.7 of the CC&Rs, BWHOA 
gave Ms. Stewart written notice of her violation of the CC&Rs, and demanded Ms. . 
Stewart bring her property into compliance with the CC&Rs. R. at 5, 57, 61, 65, and 
70-71. 
18. Ms. Stewart refused to comply with BWHOA's demand. R. at 5, 57, 65, 
and 70-71. 
19. On December 11, 2007, BWHOA filed a complaint against Ms. Stewart { 
based on her refusal to comply with BWHOA's demands. The complaint sought a 
declaratory judgment that the changes Ms. Stewart made to the Property were not 
architecturally compatible with the Barton Woods PUD. The complaint also sought an 
order enjoining Ms. Stewart from making further improvements to the Property without 
first obtaining written approval from the Design Review Committee, and ordering Ms. 
Stewart to undo, take down, and otherwise reverse the improvements already made to the 
Property. R. at 1-46. 
20. On December 11, 2007, BWHOA also filed a Notice of Recording of Lis 
Pendens against the Property in order to give notice to any potential buyers of the pending 
lawsuit. R. at 47-51. 
21. On or about January 15, 2008, Ms. Stewart filed an answer to the complaint, 
together with an amended counterclaim. R. at 63-70. 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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22 The lirsl cause of aUion asserted in the amended counterclaim stated, in its 
ei itiret> as follows: 
L The {'.(' <Vr i\" in KSUC ' run with the subject property" 
.iMii iiunc !o the benefit o\ eavh »•• - <• Iheicnf". I he\ 
are directly enforceable by | Ms. Stewart| . 
2. Insofar as the "exterior of all buildings will be 
constructed of brick on the lower part, with the upper 
part being wood, stucco and or other material 
authorized", all structures containing windows, glass or 
metal doors, or exterior material other than brick, wood 
or stucco, are in \ solanor 
3 . [Ms. Stewart | is entitled to demand that [BWHOA j . by 
its Design Review Committee, rectify such violations 
forthwith. 
Wherefore, jiVl^. Stuwani |>ia\|^j UMI MIC I =.IIL u u e r 
its Order forthwith that |BW1 IOA| prompt!} co \e r 
with bnek. wood, or stucco, all windows and glass or 
mclal doors, and other apertures in the exterior of all 
strucltii\ ^ in the subdivision HOI P.. ^ covered with 
brick, wood or ^liico>. that the Coun award [Ms. 
StewartJ her costs and fees in prosecuting the action, 
and for such other and further relief as the ( ^urt deems 
just in the p'vnHse^, 
R. at 67-68. 
2 3 . The amended counterclaim also sought aiI award of at least $250,000.00 in 
« - -ee- -* "A!. * . ^ j u e e .ippu '••;. : •-instant.ai encroachments upon [the 
Proper! ! h- Uiu uvvners oM1 i« : ' T 
2A T neither the original counterclaim whicl i Ms. Stewart had filed on 
Januan - . . : ; ( - ,ior the amended counterclaim did Ms . Stewart allege a eair< Tact ion 
f< ' »i < vroi igii il 11 : :i i, ii i ij >rop< :i lis pendi ms, < )i tliatB'VV I IO; \ "s coi i if )h in it w as i ib-isjve or 
otherwise improper. R. at 59-60, and 67-68. 
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25. On or about March 26, 2008, before any discovery had been conducted by 
either party, Ms. Stewart filed the First Motion for Summary Judgment, in which she 
argued that BWHOA had either discriminated against her or had abandoned the CC&Rs 
and/or the Amended CC&Rs. R. at 76-143.
 ( 
26. As support for the First Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Stewart 
attached numerous photographs of Lot 109 and other residences for which she provided 
i 
no evidentiary support or foundation. R. at 80, and 87-143. 
27. On or about April 24, 2008, BWHOA filed a cross motion for summary 
judgment (the "Cross Motion"). R. at 222-252. ' 
28. On or about September 12, 2008, Ms. Stewart filed a motion to strike the lis 
pendens (the "Motion to Strike Lis Pendens"). R. at 303-310. 
29. On October 17, 2008, the trial court issued a ruling regarding the First 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Cross Motion, and the Motion to Strike Lis Pendens. 
R. at 331-343. 
30. Regarding the First Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court held that 
the CC&Rs regulate colors, that the Design Review Committee has control over 
alterations, and that the trial court did not have authority to override the Design Review 
Committee's determinations. Nevertheless, the trial court determined that there were 
questions of material fact as to whether BWHOA had abandoned the CC&Rs or 
otherwise arbitrarily enforced them. Thus, the trial court denied the First Motion for 
Summary Judgment. R. at 336-338. 
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3 1 . Because there were quest ions regarding whetl ;u* or not the C C & R s .had 
hn n abandon1 'I "M
 f I I I * I ( I . I M I V n i lo i rcd IIL i i i i h n i i i i ill n denied (IK r ios^Mni i i i i i P it 
338-339. ' -: 
32. Finally, the trial court also denied the Motioi l to Strike Lis Pendens, holding 
tl mt tl le i ii idei by ing actioi i coi ild affec t title to tl i.e property because "any rights a 
prospect ive purchaser wen ild acqi lii e woi ild be si lbject to tl lis Coi it t ' s detern l ination" ai id 
h j : would be unfair to allow the new owner to purchase the h o m e witliout warn ing the 
n e w owner of the potential actions the new owner wouM be requited to take. , " R at 
33 . On December 2, 2008 , M s . Stewart initiated banki .- » .. . 
filing a petition fi u Chapter 7 bankruplcy protect ion (the "First Bankruptcy 
Proceedings ; ^ .u .»4*/- > - . 
34. On I\;eeiiibei I " MIM}' P \VI 1* ) \ tillkd :i notice ot f Js Nte\ \ar l \ 
bankruptcy with the trial coui t. R. at 349 -350 . 
35. On or about Jar-nary 26, 2009 before air- discover) had \et Uiki u place 
ai id in spite of f lei bar ik i i iptcy 1 ilii ig I\ Is . Stew art filed tl le Secoi id Motioi i foi Si immary 
Judgmen t . R. at J 5 1-359, 3o0-4.Y> ai-.t : "7 - K 3 . 
36. The SectMHI Motion lor Summary Judgmeiit essentially asserted the same 
arguments nun ^ \ Mew art h.jd made in the First Motion for Summary Judgment -
mi |! ( "C&.R s I lad beei ». abai ic lot iec I ai id ' :)i disci: in lii latoi ily ei lforced. 1 1 le 
Second Mot ion for Summary Ji ldgment relied upoi i the s; t.i ne photogn ipl is th; it I Is 
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Stewart had attached to the earlier motion for summary judgment, while attempting to 
provide evidentiary foundation for these photographs. R. at 351-358, and 360-413. * 
37. On March 5, 2009, the bankruptcy court dismissed the First Bankruptcy 
Proceedings. R. at 472-475. 
38. But before the state trial court decided the Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, on June 15, 2009 Ms. Stewart filed a petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
protection (the "Second Bankruptcy Proceedings"). BWHOA filed a notice of 
bankruptcy filing on or about July 14, 2009. R. at 659-660. 
39. On July 31, 2009, the trial court issued a ruling denying the Second Motion ' 
for Summary Judgment, holding that "genuine issues of material fact exist as to the issue 
of abandonment and discriminatory enforcement of the subdivision's restrictive 
covenants. . . ." R. at 675. 
40. The trial court's July 31, 2009 ruling also stayed the proceedings pending 
Ms. Stewart's Second Bankruptcy Proceedings. R. at 676. 
41. On August 25, 2009, the trial court signed an order denying the Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment and staying the proceedings pending the bankruptcy. R. 
at 728-729, and 734-735. 
42. Before the trial court issued the August 25 order, however, on August 10, 
2009, Ms. Stewart had filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's denial of the 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion for Reconsideration"). R. at 
678-718. 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43. In the Motion for Reconsideration, Ms. Stewart raised for the first time the 
argument that "[BWHOA] has waived all claims of violation of any covenant except that 
relating to the 'dark' color of [Ms. Stewart's] garage door." R. at 681. Ms. Stewart, 
however, provided no factual support for her contention that BWHOA had waived its 
claims. 
44. On August 27, 2009, BWHOA filed an opposition to the Motion for 
Reconsideration, arguing that this motion was not appropriate under Utah law, and that, 
given the pending bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart was likely to soon lose standing to pursue her 
counterclaims. R. at 737-741. This opposition also notified the trial court that the Motion 
for Reconsideration was the first document in which Ms. Stewart had argued that 
BWHOA had waived any claims. R. at 740-741. 
45. On November 2, 2009, the trial court denied the Motion for 
Reconsideration for the reasons advocated by BWHOA. R. at 757-758. 
46. Stepping back several months, on August 21, 2009, BAC Home Loans 
Servicing, L.P., f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P., a secured creditor in Ms. 
Stewart's Second Bankruptcy Proceedings, filed a proof of claim in those proceedings in 
connection with a loan it had made to Ms. Stewart that was secured by Lot 109. 
R. at 915-922. 
47. On September 8, 2009, Judge R. Kimball Mosier of the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah signed an Uncontested Order Confirming 
Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan. R. at 924-933. 
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48. In paragraph 9 of the bankruptcy court's Order, Judge Mosier states that 
Ms. Stewart "hereby surrenders] the collateral [i.e., the Property] to such creditor." 
R. at 927. 
49. In accordance with the bankruptcy court's order approving Ms. Stewart's 
chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, on March 11, 2010, at 10:30 a.m., the Property was sold at a 
non-judicial foreclosure sale by the successor trustee Recontrust Company, N.A. R. at 
935-936. 
50. The trustee's deed for the sale reads: "[T]he successor Trustee did, at the 
time and place of sale, then and there sell at public auction, to [Federal National 
Mortgage Association] above named, being the highest bidder therefor, the property 
described for the sum of $445,974.99." R. at 935. 
51. Shortly after the foreclosure sale, the purchaser or one of its successors 
under the trustee's deed remedied the alterations to the Property that were the subject of 
the proceedings in state court. R. at 904-907, and 909-913. 
52. On December 7, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Utah signed an order lifting the bankruptcy stay and allowing these proceedings to 
continue. R. at 764-765. 
53. Returning to the state court proceedings, on December 11, 2009, BWHOA 
filed with the trial court a Notice of Order Lifting Bankruptcy Stay and Request for Rule 
16 Conference. R. at 760-766. 
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54. On June 11, 2010, the trial court signed a stipulated case management 
order. R. at 772-774. This order set July 30, 2010, as the last date upon which motions to 
amend the pleadings could be filed. R. at 772-773. July 30, 2010 passed without Ms. 
Stewart seeking any leave to amend her counterclaim. 
55. On June 17, 2010, Ms. Stewart mailed her Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures 
to BWHOA. R. at 776-778. These disclosures listed two potential witnesses, and 
asserted that her claims were worth approximately $500,000.00, together with 
approximately $60,000.00 in legal expenses. These disclosures provided no further 
information. R. at 776-777. 
56. On August 17, 2010, BWHOA filed a Notice of Release of Lis Pendens. 
R. at 826-828. 
57. On August 24, 2010, Ms. Stewart filed the Third Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. at 779-823. 
58. On September 15, 2010, BWHOA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 
and counterclaims or in the alternative for summary judgment on all claims. R. at 829-
831. BWHOA also filed a document titled Combined Memorandum in Support of 
Motion: (1) To Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint and Defendants' Counterclaims Pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41; Or, in the Alternative, (2) For Summary Judgment on All Claims and 
Counterclaims, and in Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "September Motion"). R. at 832-936. 
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59. In the September Motion, BWHOA argued that its own complaint should be 
dismissed because the Property had been sold and the objectionable alterations had been 
remedied; thus, BWHOA's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. R. at 
837-838. 
60. The September Motion also argued that Ms. Stewart's counterclaims should 
be dismissed. Even at this late date, Ms. Stewart had never amended her pleadings to 
assert a claim of wrongful lien, wrongful lis pendens, or abusive litigation. Thus, because 
Ms. Stewart's causes of action arose from the CC&Rs, the benefits of which run with the 
land and inure to the benefit of the land's owner, BWHOA argued that, given the 
surrender and subsequent sale of the Property in bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart no longer had 
standing to pursue her counterclaims. R. at 839-841. 
61. On December 2, 2010, at oral argument Ms. Stewart's counsel admitted that 
Ms. Stewart could no longer seek injunctive relief based upon the CC&Rs or damages for 
encroachment. The transcript of the argument reads as follows: 
MR. SMAY [i.e., Ms. Stewart's counsel]: Well, I think there 
are, in fact, two matters of importance here. I think it is true 
that insofar as Ms. Stewart no longer owns the property, a 
claim respecting trespass to her property allowed by the 
Homeowners Association will have passed to the new owner 
of the property. I think that's true, but the fact of the matter 
is-
THE COURT: This is the encroachment issue. 
MR. SMAY: The encroachment issue. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. SMAY: Yes. 
THE COURT: So she no longer has that to claim. 
MR. SMA Y: I don yt think she has that claim any longer. 
That will pass. 
18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE COURT: Which I understand to be the second cause 
of action in your counterclaim. 
MR. SMA Y: Yes, Your Honor 
THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that. Let me ask you a 
question with respect to the first cause of action in your 
counterclaim, Mr. Smay, that would be helpful to the Court. 
Is there any question, in your mind, that that has been mooted 
by the fact - forget the bankruptcy - that she doesn't own the 
property anymore? That was the claim where, basically, your 
client was seeking to enforce or to require the Homeowners 
Association to enforce the CC&R's against all of the other 
property owners. Kind of tongue-in-cheek it almost seemed 
to me -
MR. SMAY: Right. She is no -
THE COURT: - and if you're going to enforce this against 
me, then I'm going to require you to enforce it against 
everybody. 
MR. SMAY: Correct. 
THE COURT: Is that not also gone with respect to this? 
MR. SMA Y: I think thaVs true. She is no longer interested 
in having those enforced. 
R. at 981 (Transcript of hearing held December 2, 2010, at page 15 line 14 through page 
16 line 7, and page 17 line 10 through page 18 line 5) (emphasis added). 
62. At the December 2, 2010 oral argument, the trial court ruled from the 
bench, granting the relief sought in the September Motion, dismissing BWHOA's 
complaint and Ms. Stewart's counterclaim, and denying an award of attorney's fees and 
costs to Ms. Stewart. R. at 981 (Transcript of hearing held December 2, 2010, at page 29 
line 18 through page 36 line 8). 
63. Specifically, the trial court stated: 
[F]rom what I've heard here from counsel and for yourself, 
Mr. Smay, is that there really is no disagreement, but what -
19 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the counterclaim should be dismissed, and the Court is, 
therefore, going to dismiss that counterclaim. 
With respect to [BWHOA's] claim, I think you find 
yourself in an interesting position where what you are wanting 
to do, basically, is have the Court give what would, at this 
point, because it's otherwise mooted, be an advisory opinion 
so that it would substantiate an award of attorneys fees and 
costs. Let me tell you and give you the benefit, at least, [of] 
the Court's thinking on that, and then I'll turn to your motion 
in just a minute. Even though I think your motion is moot at 
this point, I want to deal with it at least somewhat 
substantively here. 
We've got a situation where [Ms. Stewart] in this case 
no longer owns the property. How she got there, I think, for 
purposes of what we're dealing with right here, doesn't 
matter. She doesn't own the property anymore. As a result, I 
think we're in a situation where this issue of whether the 
Homeowners acted properly or not has become mooted, 
which moots [BWHOA's] complaint. 
[BWHOA] in this case is asking to dismiss its own complaint, 
as well as [Ms. Stewart's] counterclaim, which is being 
dismissed based on a stipulation from counsel for [Ms. 
Stewart], and rightfully so. I think that's appropriate, and the 
Court is going to decline to keep [BWHOA's] complaint alive 
for the purpose, simply, of determining whether what 
[BWHOA] did in this case, initially, in terms of enforcing the 
CC&R's and defining this lawsuit is concerned. I don't think 
the Court has anything further that's justiciable before it that 
the Court can deal with to be able to make that kind of a 
ruling. 
I will give you the benefit of at least this Court's 
feelings with respect, also, Mr. Smay, to the issue of attorneys 
fees. I don't read the attorney fee provision that is in the 
CC&R's as broadly as I think you do. I read that provision to 
say that there are fees awardable in the event there is a default 
by any party to those, and I do think the parties to those would 
include the owner of the property, as well as the 
Homeowner's Association, and any provision of the CC&R's 
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that you have to enforce because of the default of somebody 
else. 
Candidly, it appeared to me, from reviewing the file, 
that there was not that issue that ever really got litigated 
before the Court up to this point in the case. I don't think that 
it's a provision that just gives fees to the prevailing or non-
prevailing party. I think you have to be trying to enforce the 
CC&R's. 
Candidly, you had a cause of action in the first cause of 
action that sought to do that, but I think that it was, as we 
talked about a little bit earlier, a little bit tongue-in-cheek, it's 
if you're going to enforce it against me, then you better 
enforce it against everybody, and that was a point to make, 
and I suspect the point wasn't missed on Judge Memmott It 
isn't missed on me, and it probably isn't missed on 
[BWHOA's] counsel or the Homeowners Association either. 
Don't do it indiscriminately. 
I don't think the attorney fee provision is that broad, as 
I indicated. I told you how I read that, but also, I don't think 
that [Ms. Stewart] in this case is the prevailing party. On the 
only substantive portion of Judge Memmott's rulings to this 
point, the issue was - aside from finding factual issues and 
denying the motions, I don't mean to say that that's not 
substantive. It is, but in terms of actually making a ruling, 
that ruling was actually not in favor of [Ms. Stewart]. It was 
in favor of [B WHOA] in terms of the enforcement. 
So I don't think there's any attorneys fees and costs 
actually to be awarded in this case, irrespective, based on the 
history of what's occurred, and I don't believe I can keep this 
case alive by forcing [BWHOA], who wants to dismiss its 
complaint, to keep that complaint in effect in this case so that 
we can get an advisory opinion from the Court as to whether, 
ultimately, the Homeowners Association properly or 
improperly tried to enforce its CC&R's as against [Ms. 
Stewart] here. 
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I think that's the posture that we're in no matter how 
unfortunate. I'm certainly sorry for [Ms. Stewart's] loss in 
terms of the loss of the property. I don't know what is the 
base of that or what caused that. There can be all kinds of 
factors, but none of that, at least, is plead in this particular 
action. None of that is a part of the allegations in this action. 
There's no claim for that in this action, and the Court in this 
case simply can't deal with that. 
R. at 981 (transcript at page 29 line 22 through page 34 line 11). 
64. On December 20, 2010, the trial court signed a written order dismissing the 
complaint and counterclaims with prejudice, while ordering the parties to bear their own 
attorney's fees and costs. R. at 968-970. The trial court filed this judgment on 
December 22, 2010. 
65. On January 11, 2011, Ms. Stewart filed her Notice of Appeal, which stated 
that she "appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of Honorable Robert Dale 
entered in this matter December 22, 2010. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment." 
R. at 971. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court dismissed the complaint because it was moot, and the counterclaims 
because Ms. Stewart lacked standing. The cojrrectness of these decisions, and not the trial 
court's prior rulings regarding the meaning of the CC&Rs, is the only issue properly 
before the Court. 
The trial court correctly dismissed BWHOA's complaint because, by surrendering 
the Property in bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart mooted the conflict between herself and 
BWHOA. The trial court also correctly dismissed Ms. Stewart's counterclaims because, 
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by surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, and based upon admissions by her counsel, 
Ms. Stewart lacked standing to pursue her asserted counterclaims. 
Because the dismissals do not establish any culpability, there was no "prevailing 
party," and the trial court's decision not to award attorneys' fees was correct. 
Furthermore, Ms. Stewart has abandoned and/or waived any claims that would have 
justified an attorneys' fees claim under the CC&Rs. 
Ms. Stewart's brief, in addition to focusing on issues not properly before the Court, 
also makes spurious arguments regarding her right to pursue claims for wrongful lien 
and/or abusive litigation. Ms. Stewart has no right to pursue such claims, however, 
because she has never plead such claims, and the time to amend her pleadings is long 
past. 
Even if the issues stated by Ms. Stewart on appeal are properly before the Court, 
her arguments fail. The CC&Rs contain express restrictions that Ms. Stewart voluntarily 
accepted. When read in their entirety, the CC&Rs gave BWHOA the authority to require 
Ms. Stewart to rectify the objectionable alterations she had made to the Property. And 
contrary to Ms. Stewart's unfounded assertion, BWHOA never waived its right to require 
Ms. Stewart to rectify any of those alterations. 
ARGUMENT 
Ms. Stewart's brief looks beyond the mark. Instead of focusing and attacking the 
actual basis for the trial court's decision, she looks into the past and attempts to appeal 
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earlier decisions by the trial court. She further muddies the water by arguing claims that 
were never plead and facts that have never been established. 
The bases of the trial court's December 22, 2010 order dismissing the complaint 
and counterclaims - which is the only judgment that Ms. Stewart has appealed and is the 
only judgment that she can attack - are: (1) BWHOA's complaint cannot continue 
because by surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart mooted the conflict 
between herself and BWHOA; and (2) by surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, and 
based upon admissions by her counsel, Ms. Stewart lacked standing to pursue her asserted 
counterclaims. The trial court's decision on these points was correct and should be 
upheld. 
I. MS. STEWART CANNOT USE HER APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECEMBER 22, 2010, ORDER TO ATTACK EARLIER NON-FINAL 
DECISIONS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
A notice of appeal filed under Rule 4, Utah R. App. P., serves to "advise the 
opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in a particular 
case." Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 388 P.2d 798, 800 (1964) (emphasis added). 
An appellant must limit its appellate arguments to attacks upon the specific judgment 
identified in the notice. Id. The "[respondent is entitled to know specifically which 
judgment is being appealed." Id. (Emphasis added). 
On January 11, 2010, Ms. Stewart filed a Notice of Appeal regarding "the final 
judgment of Honorable Robert Dale entered in this matter December 22, 2010." The 
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notice of appeal does not reference any other judgments or decisions. Thus, Ms. Stewart 
must limit her appeal to attacks upon the specific December 22 judgment. 
She does not do so. Instead, she focuses the bulk of her appeal on arguments she 
raised in the First Motion for Summary Judgment, the Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, which played no role in the trial court's 
decision to dismiss the complaint and counterclaims.1 
Ms. Stewart's statement of facts further illustrates her failure to limit her appeal to 
the December 22, 2010 judgment. In paragraphs 6 through 8 of her statement of facts, 
Ms. Stewart identifies holdings from trial court decisions dated October 2008 and July 
2009. Those holdings, however, were irrelevant to the court's ultimate decision to 
dismiss the litigation for mootness and lack of standing. 
BWHOA was put on notice that the specific December 22, 2010, judgment was 
being appealed. Ms. Stewart's brief, however, attempts to broaden the scope of her 
appeal to encompass earlier decisions. She should not be allowed to do so. Instead, the 
Court should look at the rationale for the trial court's December 22, 2010 judgment and 
determine its correctness. 
1
 Ms. Stewart's fourth issue statement, while citing her response to the September 
Motion - i.e., the motion that ultimately resulted in the litigation's dismissal - is fatally 
flawed for several reasons that will be discussed in depth below. First, there is no 
evidence in the record that the litigation drove Ms. Stewart into bankruptcy. And second, 
Ms. Stewart cannot argue that the litigation and/or the lis pendens were wrongful or 
abusive because she has never asserted those claims against BWHOA. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BWHOA'S COMPLAINT 
BECAUSE NO CONTROVERSY EXISTS AND BWHOA'S COMPLAINT 
IS MOOT. 
Utah has a "strong judicial policy against giving advisory opinions [that] dictates 
that courts refrain from adjudicating moot questions." Merhish v. K A. Folson & 
Associates, 646 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1982), citing State v. Stromquist, 639 P.2d 171 (Utah 
1981), andHoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980). Thus, "[i]f the requested judicial 
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the case is moot and a court will normally 
refrain from adjudicating it on the merits." Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (1981); 
Spain v. Stewart, 639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981). "Once a controversy has become moot, 
a trial court should enter an order of dismissal." Merhish, 646 P.2d at 732 (emphasis 
added). 
Because the alterations to the Property were remedied after the foreclosure sale, a 
controversy no longer existed between BWHOA and Ms. Stewart. BWHOA's complaint 
had sought a declaration that "the CC&Rs prevent [Ms. Stewart] from making the 
referenced improvements to [the Property] without obtaining prior written approval from 
the Design Review Committee, that the improvements made to [the Property] are not 
'architecturally compatible' with the subdivision, and that the improvements to [the 
Property] do not establish and preserve a harmonious design for the subdivision." Record 
at 5, Tj 27. BWHOA had also sought an injunction preventing Ms. Stewart "from making 
further improvements to [the Property] without first obtaining written approval from the 
Design Review Committee, and ordering [Ms. Stewart] to undo, take down, and 
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otherwise reverse the improvements made to [the Property] alleged herein" Record 
at 6, f 33 (emphasis added). 
BWHOA described the particular improvements at issue in paragraph 19 of the 
complaint. They included "installing dark wood shutters on the front exterior of the 
home, painting the garage door dark brown/brass, painting the entry to the home a dark 
brown/brass, installing or painting the home's curbside mailbox a dark brown/brass, and 
installing rocks on portions of the front exterior walls of the home." Record at 4, ^ 19. 
The alterations to the Property were photographed around the time this case was 
commenced. Record at 904-907. These changes to the Property, and the fact they were 
made by Ms. Stewart without obtaining prior approval from BWHOA's Design Review 
Committee, were admitted by Ms. Stewart in her Answer and Amended Counterclaim. 
Record at 65, H 19-20. 
More recent photographs of the Property show that the objectionable alterations 
have been remedied. The wood shutters have been removed, the garage door has been 
repainted a lighter color, the entryway has been renovated to a lighter wood color, the 
mailbox is now white, and the exterior stonework has been removed. Record at 904-905 
& 909-913. Thus, BWHOA realized that the factual basis for the requested declaratory 
and injunctive relief no longer existed, and it requested that the complaint be dismissed. 
Furthermore, because Ms. Stewart no longer owns the Property, any injunction 
requiring her to comply with the relevant CC&Rs would have been of no effect. If 
BWHOA had continued the lawsuit, any relief it ultimately received would not have 
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affected the rights of either party: BWHOA would not have been able to receive more 
than it had already received, and any order requiring Ms. Stewart to do anything regarding 
the Property would have been toothless. Thus, the controversy regarding BWHOA's 
complaint was moot, and the trial court correctly dismissed BWHOA5s complaint.2 
HI. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MS. STEWART'S 
COUNTERCLAIMS BECAUSE SHE NO LONGER HAS ANY INTEREST 
IN THE PROPERTY AND SHE HAS ADMITTED THAT SHE CAN NO 
LONGER ASSERT THEM. 
The trial court dismissed Ms. Stewart's counterclaims because she lacked standing. 
Standing is a prerequisite to invoking a court's subject matter jurisdiction. Brown v. Div. 
of Water Rights ofDept of Natural Res., 228 P.3d 747, 750 (Utah 2010). As such, it can 
be raised as a defense at any time. Id. at 751. To establish standing, the party invoking 
the court's jurisdiction must establish three things: (1) injury; (2) causation; and (3) 
2
 Given Utah's strong policy against advisory opinions, this Court should not 
address Ms. Stewart's arguments regarding the meaning or interpretation of the CC&Rs, 
or the alleged history of inconsistent enforcement of the CC&Rs. Because Ms. Stewart 
no longer owns the Property, she no longer has the right to invoke or seek to enforce the 
CC&Rs. Conditions, covenants and restrictions that run with the land "form a contract 
between subdivision property owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore, 
interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of construction as those used 
to interpret contracts." See Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 811 (Utah 2000). "One 
of the most basic principles of contract law is that, as a general rule, only parties to the 
contract may enforce the rights and obligations created by the contract." Wagner v. 
Clifton, 62 P.3d 440, 442 (Utah 2002). 
Because Ms. Stewart surrendered the Property, she is no longer a party to the 
CC&Rs and, therefore, cannot sue to enforce them. Thus, there is not, and cannot be, any 
conflict between BWHOA and Ms. Stewart regarding the CC&Rs. In the absence of a 
conflict, any decision by this Court regarding the CC&Rs would necessarily be advisory 
in nature. 
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redressability. Id. at 752. These elements are indispensable and it is the responsibility of 
the party invoking the court's jurisdiction to ensure that these elements exist at all stages 
of the litigation. Id. at 751, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 
(1992). 
Ms. Stewart cannot satisfy these elements. Ms. Stewart's alleged injuries were 
dependent upon her ownership of the Property. By surrendering the Property, she cannot 
claim that her interests face any injury. Because she has surrendered the Property, and 
given the nature of her asserted counterclaims, any remedy that the trial court might have 
fashioned would not have given any redress to Ms. Stewart. And Ms. Stewart's counsel 
has admitted that Ms. Stewart lacks standing to pursue her counterclaims. 
A. Ms. Stewart lost her ability to maintain her counterclaims when she 
surrendered the Property in bankruptcy. 
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C), a debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy may 
surrender property securing a claim to that creditor. Such surrender contemplates "a 
return of property and a relinquishing of possession or control to the holder of the claim." 
In re Stone, 166 B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993). See also In Re Robertson, 72 
B.R. 2, 4 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) ("Thus, it would clearly appear that Congress 
contemplated the term to mean the return and relinquishing of possession or control to the 
holder of a claim. This is consistent with the definition provided in Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, dated 1966. That definition sets forth that the term 'surrender' 
means 'to give up to the holder in remainder or reversion; to relinquish to the grantor; to 
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deliver into lawful custody . . . to give or deliver up possession of upon compulsion or 
demand.'"). 
Ms. Stewart gave up possession and control of the Property to her mortgage lender 
when she surrendered the Property in bankruptcy. Record at 927. The lender 
subsequently sold the Property at a trustee's sale. Record at 935-936. 
Accordingly, Ms. Stewart can no longer maintain her counterclaims. In her 
Answer and Amended Counterclaim, Ms. Stewart admitted that the basis of her first 
cause of action is the CC&Rs, which '"run with the subject property' and c inure to the 
benefit of each owner thereof.'" Record at 67, ^ f 1. Because the right to seek injunctive 
relief runs with the land and is contingent upon ownership of the Property, Ms. Stewart 
does not have standing to assert her counterclaim for injunctive relief. 
By surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, Ms. Stewart no longer has standing to 
pursue a claim for encroachment as a simple matter of contract law. Conditions, 
covenants and restrictions that run with the land "form a contract between subdivision 
property owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore, interpretation of the 
covenants is governed by the same rules of construction as those used to interpret 
contracts." See Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 811 (Utah 2000). "One of the most 
basic principles of contract law is that, as a general rule, only parties to the contract may 
enforce the rights and obligations created by the contract." Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P.3d 
440, 442 (Utah 2002). Thus, when considering which party can enforce a restrictive 
covenant the Utah Supreme Court has held that a covenant that runs with the land 
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"bestows a benefit or imposes a burden only on the rights of a landholder, as 
landholder:' Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 
1989) (emphasis added).3 
Ms. Stewart is no longer in any legal position to invoke rights granted by the 
CC&Rs. The right to sue to enforce rights arising from the CC&Rs is a right that runs 
with the land and only inures to the benefit of property owners in the Barton Woods PUD. 
Ms. Stewart is no longer a party to the CC&Rs and she cannot sue for any alleged 
violations of that contract. 
The CC&Rs make clear that only current property owners have the right to sue for 
violations of the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs prefatory language states the CC&Rs are "for the 
purposes of protecting the value and desirability of the subject property and . . . shall run 
with the subject property and be binding on all parties having any rights, title or interest 
in that subject property or any part thereof. . . and shall inure to the benefit of each 
owner thereof" Record, at 5. By the very terms of the document she argues BWHOA 
violated, Ms. Stewart no longer has legal standing to pursue any cause of action against 
BWHOA for damages resulting from alleged encroachment by a neighbor. 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court's holding comports with the positions taken in sister 
states. For instance, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated as follows: "The 
Supreme Court has said that the right to sue and enforce restrictive covenants against any 
other lot owner taking with record notice 'rests upon the principle that a negative 
easement of this sort is a property right amounting to an interest in land."' Taylor v. 
Kenton, 413 S.E.2d 576, 579-80 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), quoting Craven County v. First 
Citizens Bank and Trust, 75 S.E.2d 620, 628 (1953). 
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B. Ms. Stewart's counsel has admitted that Ms. Stewart cannot maintain her 
counterclaims. 
During the December 2, 2010 oral argument regarding the Third Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the September Motion, Ms. Stewart's counsel, Craig Smay, 
stated that Ms. Stewart no longer had the right to sue BWHOA for encroachment, and he 
agreed with the trial court that, by virtue of surrendering the Property in bankruptcy, Ms. 
Stewart no longer had the right to seek enforcement of the CC&Rs. In short, Mr. Smay 
admitted that Ms. Stewart no longer had standing to pursue her only two counterclaims. 
Admissions by a party opponent are, at the very least, highly probative of contested 
legal issues. For instance, "[w]hen an admission is treated as a matter of pleading . . . the 
admission is necessarily conclusive as to the facts admitted," and "precludes the pleader 
from denying obligations implied by law from such admitted facts." Garland v. 
Fleischman, 831 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah 1992). See also Toone v. P. J. O'Neill Construction 
Co., 121 P. 10, 13 (Utah 1912) ("If the defendant admits any fact or facts in its answer, it 
thereby waives proof of all facts thus admitted, and the issue to which such admissions 
relate must be determined in accordance with such admissions."). Thus, Mr. Smay's 
admissions, although not provided in the pleading context, should be given great weight 
in determining whether Ms. Stewart has standing to pursue her alleged counterclaims. 
Mr. Smay's admissions are compelling evidence that Ms. Stewart has waived her 
right to pursue her asserted counterclaims. "To establish waiver, a defendant must show 
that the plaintiff had (1) an existing right, (2) knowledge of its existence, and (3) an intent 
to relinquish the right." IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D &KMgmt.} Inc., 196 P.3d 588, 
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594 (Utah 2008). Mr. Smay's colloquy with Judge Dale shows that Mr. Smay clearly 
knew the existence and nature of his client's counterclaim rights - indeed, Mr. Smay had 
drafted the counterclaims - and that Ms. Stewart no longer intended to pursue those 
claims. R. at 981 (Transcript of hearing held December 2, 2010, at page 15 line 14 
through page 16 line 7, and page 17 line 10 through page 18 line 5). Thus, because Ms. 
Stewart is bound by the actions of her attorney when he is acting within the scope of his 
authority (see Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)), during the 
December 2, 2010, oral argument Ms. Stewart waived her right to pursue all of her 
asserted counterclaims. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES TO MS. STEWART BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT A PREVAILING 
PARTY AND THE CC&RS DID NOT ALLOW AN AWARD. 
"As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and 
only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract." Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. 
Wardley Corp., 246 P.3d 131, 146 (Utah Ct. App. 2010), quoting Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 
218 P.3d 598, \ 32 (Utah 2009). The trial court denied an award of attorneys' fees and 
costs to Ms. Stewart because she was not a prevailing party. 
At its heart, the question of whether or not a party prevails is a question of who the 
court determines culpable. "It is the determination of culpability . . . that determines who 
is the prevailing party." Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Thus, u[w]hile a reduction in the amount claimed by a plaintiff may seem a moral and 
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financial victory for a defendant, it does not make the defendant the 'prevailing party' in 
terms of attorney fees." Id. 
Although Brown involved legal as opposed to equitable claims, there is no reason 
why the rationale should not apply in the present case. Although Ms. Stewart has avoided 
the effects of B WHOA's complaint, such avoidance is the result of her sale of the 
Property and not a judicial determination of culpability. Thus, even though Ms. Stewart 
may have the moral victory of avoiding a judgment, she is not the prevailing party. 
The trial court recognized as much during the December 2, 2010 oral argument 
when Judge Dale stated: 
I don't think that [Ms. Stewart] in this case is the prevailing 
party. On the only substantive portion of Judge Memmott's 
rulings to this point, the issue was - aside from finding factual 
issues and denying the motions, I don't mean to say that that's 
not substantive. It is, but in terms of actually making a ruling, 
that ruling was actually not in favor of [Ms. Stewart]. It was 
in favor of [BWHOA] in terms of the enforcement. 
Furthermore, the CC&Rs do not allow an award of attorneys fees to Ms. Stewart in 
connection with her counterclaims. The CC&R section allowing attorney fees states: 
"If any party governed by the terms of this Declaration defaults under any provision 
hereof, that defaulting party shall pay all costs and attorney's fees incurred by another 
party to enforce the provisions hereof, whether incurred through formal lawsuit or 
otherwise." 
Thus, the party seeking to recover fees must first be seeking to enforce the 
CC&Rs. As explained above, Ms. Stewart has no standing to assert her counterclaim to 
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enforce the CC&Rs and/or has waived that claim. The trial court explained the situation 
as follows: 
I will give you the benefit of at least this Court's feelings with 
respect, also, Mr. Smay, to the issue of attorneys fees. I don't 
read the attorney fee provision that is in the CC&R's as 
broadly as I think you do. I read that provision to say that 
there are fees awardable in the event there is a default by any 
party to those, and I do think the parties to those would 
include the owner of the property, as well as the 
Homeowner's Association, and any provision of the CC&R's 
that you have to enforce because of the default of somebody 
else. 
Candidly, it appeared to me, from reviewing the file, 
that there was not that issue that ever really got litigated 
before the Court up to this point in the case. I don't think that 
it's a provision that just gives fees to the prevailing or non-
prevailing party. I think you have to be trying to enforce the 
CC&R's. 
Candidly, you had a cause of action in the first cause of 
action that sought to do that, but I think that it was, as we 
talked about a little bit earlier, a little bit tongue-in-cheek, it's 
if you're going to enforce it against me, then you better 
enforce it against everybody, and that was a point to make, 
and I suspect the point wasn't missed on Judge Memmott. It 
isn't missed on me, and it probably isn't missed on 
[BWHOA's] counsel or the Homeowners Association either. 
Don't do it indiscriminately. 
As Mr. Smay admitted, Ms. Stewart has no cognizable claim to enforce the 
CC&Rs. Thus, the trial court's decision regarding attorneys' fees and costs can hardly be 
said to be patent error or clear abuse of discretion. 
And Ms. Stewart cannot point to any other bases for asserting a right to attorneys' 
fees and costs. Despite her contentions otherwise Ms. Stewart has never asserted any 
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claims for wrongful lien and/or abusive litigation. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely, 
given that such claims are not directed at enforcing the CC&RS, that any such claims 
would fall within the limited confines in which the CC&Rs allow an award of attorneys' 
fees and costs. 
Thus, the trial court's denial of attorneys' fees and costs was not patent error or a 
clear abuse of discretion and should stand. 
V. MS. STEWART HAS NEVER ASSERTED CLAIMS FOR ABUSIVE 
LITIGATION AND/OR WRONGFUL LIEN; THUS, THESE ISSUES ARE 
NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Ms. Stewart has never amended her counterclaims to include claims for abusive 
litigation and/or improper lien. Her January 15, 2008 amended counterclaim - which is 
her most recent pleading - seeks to enforce the CC&Rs and to recover damages for 
alleged encroachments upon her property. Nowhere in this pleading does she state any 
facts from which any reasonable person could deduce that she intended to sue for abusive 
litigation and or improper lien. And the deadline for amending her pleadings to include 
such causes of action - July 30, 2010 - is long past. Thus, any arguments regarding those 
issues are not properly before the Court. 
Even though Utah only requires notice pleading, a party's pleadings must still give 
adequate notice of claims to be asserted. As clarified by this Court: 
Although "[t]he plaintiff must only give the defendant 'fair 
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a 
general indication of the type of litigation involved/ " 
[Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, ^ 14, 122 P.3d 622] 
(quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 
(Utah 1982)), it must do at least that much, see Harper v. 
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Evans, 2008 UT App 165, f 13, 185 P.3d 573 ("[T]he 
[plaintiffs'] amended complaint alleges only that [the 
defendants negligently performed the November 2002 
surgeries and nothing more. These allegations, standing alone, 
do not state a claim for relief for continuous negligent 
treatment, even under Utah's liberal notice pleading 
requirements." (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
AsaelFarr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 193 P.3d 650, 657-58 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
When a pleading fails to at least give fair notice of claims, courts may not consider 
any such claims. Id. at 658. And a party cannot amend its pleading "by raising novel 
claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or 
for summary judgment, Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir.1989); 
McDowell v. Sullivan, 132 F.R.D. 501, 502 (N.D.I11.1990), because such amendment fails 
to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7, 8, 9, 10." Holmes Dev.f 
LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 904 (Utah 2002). 
That is precisely what Ms. Stewart has attempted to do. In opposition to the 
September Motion, Ms. Stewart argues that she needs to be allowed to pursue additional 
causes of action that she has never plead. But she is bound by her pleadings. 
In Cook, the Utah Supreme Court refused to hear a cause of action not asserted in 
the complaint. According to that court, "because [plaintiff] failed to raise a breach of 
contract action in its complaint against [defendant] that was not predicated either upon 
third-party beneficiary liability or upon the title insurance policy, any claim that 
[defendant] assumed and breached additional contractual duties to [plaintiff] was 
waived." Id. 
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For the same reason, Ms. Stewart waived any claims not asserted in her 
January 15, 2008 pleading. Accordingly, any arguments on appeal regarding abusive 
litigation and/or wrongful lien are not properly before the Court and should not be 
considered. 
VI. BWHOA HAS NEVER ABANDONED OR WAIVED ANY CLAIMS 
AGAINST MS. STEWART. 
Before addressing BWHOA's authority to seek enforcement of the CC&Rs 
through litigation, BWHOA must disabuse the Court of one of Ms. Stewart's unsupported 
and unsupportable claims: BWHOA never waived all of its claims against Ms. Stewart 
except for a claim regarding garage color. 
As support for this assertion, Ms. Stewart refers to the 57-paragraph Declaration of 
Keith Jones, a member of BWHOA. But Ms. Stewart does not specify in which 
paragraph BWHOA allegedly made this waiver. A full reading of the declaration reveals 
no such waiver. The purpose of the declaration was to show the numerous violations that 
existed on the Property in comparison to the other houses in the subdivision. For 
instance, in paragraph 13 of the declaration, Mr. Jones states that the Property 
has a dark brown garage door, dark exterior shutters, dark 
stone or rock above the front entrance and the garage, and a 
brown mailbox. The dark stone above the garage door and 
front entrance is completely different from the brick that 
covers the other portions of the home's exteriors. There are 
no properties in the BWHOA that have these features. From 
my standpoint as a member of the [Design Review 
Committee], this property violates the CC&Rs because of 
these features, and because the owner never obtained approval 
from the DRC prior to making these changes to the property. 
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R. at 622. 
This language, especially in the context of the entire declaration, can hardly be said 
to even hint at a distinct and intentional waiver by BWHOA of a known right. See 
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) 
(establishing standard for proving waiver of a legal right). Rather, it is clear that the 
declaration was intended to catalog all of Ms. Stewart's violations. 
In short, BWHOA never waived or otherwise abandoned any claims against Ms. 
Stewart. 
VII. BWHOA HAD AUTHORITY TO TAKE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST MS. 
STEWART FOR NUMEROUS VIOLATIONS OF THE CC&RS. 
When a party voluntarily purchases land that is subject to recorded covenants, that 
party is generally unable to avoid the effect of those covenants. According to the Utah 
Supreme Court, "recorded restrictive covenants are enforceable against property owners 
who purchased land 'subject to' those covenants." Workman v. Brighton Properties, Inc., 
976 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 1999). This Court has even noted that "[a]s a general 
proposition, property owners who have purchased land in a subdivision, subject to a 
recorded set of restrictive covenants and conditions, have the right to enforce such 
restrictions through equitable relief against property owners who do not comply with the 
stated restrictions." Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). BWHOA, 
as the homeowners association, enjoys the same right. 
The specific rights that BWHOA has the authority to enforce through litigation is 
determined by the CC&Rs, as interpreted by principles of contract law. S. Ridge 
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< 
Homeowners'Ass'n v. Brown, 226 P.3d 758, 759 (Utah Ct. App. 2010).4 Paragraph 5.3 
of the CC&Rs states that "[a]ll buildings, alterations, improvements, additions and 
maintenance on the Subject Property shall be made in a workmanlike manner and shall be 
architecturally compatible with the rest of the Project." R. at 20-21. Furthermore, the 
CC&Rs state that the purpose of the Design Review Committee is to "create, maintain 
and improve Barton Woods Planned Unit Development as a pleasant and desirable 
environment, to establish and preserve a harmonious design for the community and to 
protect and promote the value of the Property, exterior design, landscaping and changes 
or alterations to the existing use of the Property." R. at 40 (emphasis added). To this end, 
the CC&Rs require "prior written approval" from the Management Committee of the 
Association [aka the Design Review Committee] before any improvements are 
constructed, and, moreover, the Design Review Committee has the power to "reject any 
home and landscape plans it deems do not comply with the provisions of this 
Declaration." R. at 41. 
4
 Ms. Stewart muddies the water by misplaced reliance upon St. Benedict's Dev. 
Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991). St Benedict's focused on 
whether or not the court could imply a restrictive covenant in the absence of an express 
covenant. In contrast, the present case involves express recorded covenants. Although 
Ms. Stewart may not agree with the trial court's interpretation of the word "alterations" or 
the court's understanding of what constitutes an "architectural" change, these terms are 
used in express grants of power to BWHOA and its Design Review Committee. Thus, 
there is no argument that BWHOA is acting under an unwritten implied power; there is a 
disagreement as to the boundaries of BWHOA's express powers. Accordingly, Ms. 
Stewart's invocation of St Benedict's requirements of "plain and unmistakable" support 
or necessity as a matter of law are inapposite, the better guide being the general principle 
that express recorded covenants are generally enforceable in equity. 
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Ms. Stewart argues that the CC&Rs are not clear because, according to an 
unnaturally crimped reading, Section 5.3 only gives power to BWHOA over alterations 
that affect use and/or function. But Section 5.3 must be read together with the provision 
requiring a harmonious design within the development. Section 5.3 must also be read in 
connection with the provision that requires prior written approval from the Design 
Review Committee before any improvements are attempted, so that the proper checks and 
balances can be invoked to ensure the harmonious design with the rest of the 
development. 
Furthermore, by its own terms Section 5.3 is not limited to BWHOA's power over 
alterations that only affect use or function. Section 5.3 contains no such express 
limitations. Indeed, Section 5.3's language is very broad. It grants the BWHOA and its 
Design Review Committee power to ensure that all "alterations, improvements, [and] 
additions" are "architecturally compatible with the rest of the Project." These powers are 
in addition to BWHOA's authority over "buildings." Thus, by including power over 
alterations, improvements and additions over and above the power to control buildings, 
the BWHOA's power necessarily includes power over decisions not merely related to use 
and function. 
Furthermore, Ms. Stewart's argument is ultimately untenable. Her argument 
ignores a dispositive fact in this case, which is that the CC&R's required Ms. Stewart to 
obtain the approval of the Design Review Committee before making improvements to her 
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home. It is undisputed that Ms. Stewart's improvements were accomplished without 
obtaining the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee. 
The foregoing restrictions, including the requirement that Ms. Stewart first apply 
to the Design Review Committee, serve the underlying purpose of the CC&Rs. The 
CC&Rs, and the Designed Review Committee, are intended "to create, maintain and 
improve Barton Woods Planned Unit Development as a pleasant and desirable 
environment, to establish and preserve a harmonious design for the community and to 
protect and promote the value of the Property, exterior design, landscaping and changes 
or alterations to the existing use of the Property." R. at 40. Controlling color and 
materials ensures harmony in the exterior design, landscaping, changes or alterations. 
This harmony protects property values and the desired character of the neighborhood. 
Thus, these restrictions are neither arbitrary nor capricious, and BWHOA may seek their 
enforcement. 
VIII. CONCLUSION. 
Ms. Stewart bought a house in a subdivision governed by clear, enforceable, 
recorded restrictive covenants. She then made significant changes to the Property that 
violated the covenants. She refused to fix the alterations when asked to do so. After her 
refusals, BWHOA sought equitable relief to force her to obey her contractual obligations. 
Again, instead of doing what she was obligated to do, she sued BWHOA, but failed to 
conduct any discovery to support her claims. Furthermore, she never amended her claims 
to include causes of action for improper lien or wrongful litigation. She did, however, 
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file for bankruptcy, during which she surrendered the Property. The subsequent owner of 
the Property fixed all of the problems, and BWHOA realized that any continued lawsuit 
against Ms. Stewart would result in it receiving nothing more than it had already received. 
Ms. Stewart's attorney also realized that, because of her bankruptcy, the basis for her 
claims against BWHOA no longer existed and admitted that all of the claims she had 
actually asserted were waived. Thus, the trial court did all it could do - it dismissed the 
entire case and ordered the parties to bear their own costs. 
Thus, for these reasons, and for all the reasons set forth in detail above, the trial 
court's decision was proper and should be upheld. 
DATED this J day of August, 2011. 
WOOD JENKINS LLC 
Richard J. Armstrong 
Brinton M. Wilkins 
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff 
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Addendum A 
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a 
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 
3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a 
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of 4he trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions. 
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for all 
parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the motion: 
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or 
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry of 
an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry of the 
order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective to appeal only 
from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any motion listed in 
Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the 
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order.(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or 
order. A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but 
before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other 
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of 
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or 
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 
30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A 
motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court 
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be 
given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No 
extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of 
the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing 
that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate the 
thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking such reinstatement shall file a 
written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the defendant is not Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30 
days after service of the motion to file a written response. If the prosecutor opposes the 
motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties may present evidence. If the trial 
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has demonstrated that he 
was deprived of his right to appeal, it shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The 
defendant's notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after 
the date of entry of the order. 
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution 
files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it 
is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely 
filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of 
deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in 
the manner provided in this paragraph (g), the 14-day period provided in paragraph (d) runs 
from the date when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal. 
Advisory Committee Note: 
Subsection (f) was adopted to implement the holding and procedure outlined in Manning 
v. State, 2005 UT61, 122 P.3d 628. 
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§ 1325. Confirmation of plan, 11 USCA § 1325 
United States Code Annotated 
Title l i . Bankruptcy (Refs & Annos) 
Chapter 13. Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. The Plan 
11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 
§ 1325. Confirmation of plan 
Effective: December 22, 2010 
Currentness 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if~ 
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the other applicable provisions of this title; 
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the plan, to be paid before 
confirmation, has been paid; 
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law; 
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each 
allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor 
were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date; 
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan— 
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; 
(B)(i) the plan provides that— 
(I) the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim until the earlier of— 
(aa) the payment of the underlying debt determined under nonbankruptcy law; or 
(bb) discharge under section 1328; and 
(II) if the case under this chapter is dismissed or converted without completion of the plan, such lien shall 
also be retained by such holder to the extent recognized by applicable nonbankruptcy law; 
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of 
such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; and 
(iii)if--
(I) property to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is in the form of periodic payments, such payments 
shall be in equal monthly amounts; and 
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§ 1325. Confirmation of plan, 11 USCA § 1325 
(II) the holder of the claim is secured by personal property, the amount of such payments shall not be 
less than an amount sufficient to provide to the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period 
of the plan; or 
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder; 
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan; 
(7) the action of the debtor in filing the petition was in good faith; 
(8) the debtor has paid all amounts that are required to be paid under a domestic support obligation and that first 
become payable after the date of the filing of the petition if the debtor is required by a judicial or administrative 
order, or by statute, to pay such domestic support obligation; and 
(9) the debtor has filed all applicable Federal, State, and local tax returns as required by section 1308. 
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has 
a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within 
the 910-day period preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor 
vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that 
debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. 
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the 
court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan— 
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the 
amount of such claim; or 
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the applicable 
commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make 
payments to unsecured creditors under the plan. 
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term "disposable income" means current monthly income received by 
the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care payments, or disability payments for a dependent child 
made in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for 
such child) less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended— 
(A)(i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, or for a domestic support 
obligation, that first becomes payable after the date the petition is filed; and 
(ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of "charitable contribution" under section 548(d)(3)) 
to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as defined in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to 
exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for the year in which the contributions are made; and 
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, 
preservation, and operation of such business. 
(3) Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2), other than subparagraph (A)(ii) of 
paragraph (2), shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2), if the debtor 
has current monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than— 
(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the applicable State for 
1 earner; 
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§ 1325. Confirmation of plan, 11 USCA § 1325 
(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family income of the 
applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or 
(C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family income of the 
applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $625 per month for each individual in excess of 4. 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the "applicable commitment period"--
(A) subject to subparagraph (B), shall be— 
(i) 3 years; or 
(ii) not less than 5 years, if the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse combined, when 
multiplied by 12, is not less than— 
(I) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the applicable State 
for 1 earner; 
(II) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family income of 
the applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals; or 
(III) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median family income 
of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $625 per month for each individual 
in excess of 4; and 
(B) may be less than 3 or 5 years, whichever is applicable under subparagraph (A), but only if the plan provides 
for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter period. 
(c) After confirmation of a plan, the court may order any entity from whom the debtor receives income to pay 
all or any part of such income to the trustee. 
Credits 
(Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2649; Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, §§ 317, 530, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 356, 
389; Pub.L, 99-554, Title II, § 283(y), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3118; Pub.L. 105-183, § 4(a), June 19,1998, 112 
Stat. 518; Pub.L. 109-8, Title I, § 102(g), (h). Title II, § 213(10), Title III, §§ 306(a), (b), 309(c)(1), 318(2), (3), 
Title VII, § 716(a), Apr. 20,2005,119 Stat. 33, 53, 80, 83, 93 129; Pub.L. 109-439, § 2, Dec. 20,2006,120 Stat. 
3285; Pub.L. 111-327, § 2(a)(44), Dec. 22, 2010, 124 Stat. 3562.) 
Notes of Decisions (2097) 
Current through P.L. 112-24 approved 7-26-11 
Footnotes 
1 Dollar amount as adjusted by the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Adjustment of Dollar Amounts notes 
set out under this section and 11 U.S.C.A. § 104. 
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Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and Issued by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses 
may be signed and served. 
(b)(i) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be 
served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause 
shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative. 
(b)(ii) In any action brought against two or more defendants on which service has been timely obtained upon one of them, 
(b)(ii)(A) the plaintiff may proceed against those served, and 
(b)(ii)(B) the others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. 
(c)(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the action, and the 
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs 
attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time within which the defendant is 
required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will 
be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed 
with the court within ten days of service. 
(c)(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state that the defendant need not answer if the 
complaint is not filed within 10 days after service and shall state the telephone number of the clerk of the court where the 
defendant may call at least 13 days after service to determine if the complaint has been filed. 
(c)(3) If service is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or other relief 
demanded, and that the complaint Is on file with the court. 
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and complaint shall be by one of the folbwjng methods: 
(d)(1) Personal service. The summons and complaint may be served in any state or judicial district of the United States by the 
sheriff or constable or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 
years of age or older at the time of service and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. If the person to be served refuses 
to accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient If the person serving the same shall state the name of the process and 
offer to deliver a copy thereof. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(d)(1)(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (B), (C) or (D) below, by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint 
to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process; 
(d)(1)(B) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the infant 
and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care 
and control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is employed; 
(d)(1)(C) Upon an individual judicially declared to be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting the person's own affairs, by 
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the person and to the person's legal representative if one has been 
appointed and in the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, custody or control of the person; 
(d)(1)(D) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions, by 
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the person who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be 
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to be served if one has been appointed, 
who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served; 
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporatbn not herein otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or upon an unincorporated association 
which Is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing 
or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one 
authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of the summons and the complaint to 
the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as 
having, an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the 
person in charge of such office or place of business; 
(d)(1)(F) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the recorder; 
(d)(1)(G) Upon a county, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the county clerk of such county; 
(d)(1)(H) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the 
superintendent or business administrator of the board; 
(d)( l ) ( I ) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the president or 
secretary of its board; 
(d)( l)(J) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be brought against the state, by delivering a copy of 
the summons and the complaint to the attorney general and any other person or agency required by statute to be served; and 
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(d)( l ) (K) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by 
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to any member of its governing board, or to its executive empbyee or 
secretary. 
(d)(2) Service by mail or commercial courier service. 
(d)(2)(A) The summons and complaint may be served upon an individual other than one covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(B) or 
(d)(1)(C) by mail or commercial courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States provided the defendant signs a 
document indicating receipt. 
(d)(2)(B) The summons and complaint may be served upon an entity covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(E) through (d)( l ) ( I ) by mail 
or commercial courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States provided defendant's agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process signs a document indicating receipt. 
(d)(2)(C) Service by mail or commercial courier service shall be complete on the date the receipt is signed as provided by this 
rule. 
(d)(3) Service in a foreign country. Service in a foreign country shall be made as follows: 
(d)(3)(A) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those means authorized by the Hague 
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents; 
(d)(3)(B) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable international agreement allows other means of 
service, provided that service is reasonably calculated to give notice: 
(d)(3)(B)(i) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of its courts 
of general jurisdiction; 
(d)(3)(B)(ii) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or 
(d)(3)(B)(iii) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by delivery to the individual personally of a copy of the summons 
and the complaint or by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to 
the party to be served; or 
(d)(3)(C) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the court. 
(d)(4) Other service. 
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through 
reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or where there exists 
good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of process may file a 
motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication or by some other means. The supporting affidavit 
shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which make it 
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties. 
(d)(4)(B) If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by publication or by other means, provided that the 
means of notice employed shall be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the 
pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. The court's order shall also specify, the content of the 
process to be served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed complete. Unless service is by publication, a 
copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with the process specified by the court. 
(d)(4)(C) In any proceeding where summons is required to be published, the court shall, upon the request of the party applying 
for publication, designate the newspaper in which publication shall be made. The newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of 
general circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and shall be published in the English language. 
(e) Proof of Service. 
(e)(1) If service is not waived, the person effecting service shall file proof with the court. The proof of service must state the date, 
place, and manner of service. Proof of service made pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) shall include a receipt signed by the defendant 
or defendant's agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. If service is made by a person other than 
by an attorney, the sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, the 
proof of service shall be made by affidavit. 
(e)(2) Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed in these rules for service within this state, or by the law of 
the foreign country, or by order of the court. When service is made pursuant to paragraph (d)(3)(C), proof of service shall include 
a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court. 
(e)(3) Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. The court may allow proof of service to be 
amended. 
(f) Waiver of Service; Payment of Costs for Refusing to Waive. 
(f)(1) A plaintiff may request a defendant subject to service under paragraph (d) to waive service of a summons. The request 
shall be mailed or delivered to the person upon whom service is authorized under paragraph (d). It shall include a copy of the 
complaint, shall allow the defendant at least 20 days from the date on which the request is sent to return the waiver, or 30 days if 
addressed to a defendant outside of the United States, and shall be substantially in the form of the Notice of Lawsuit and Request 
for Waiver of Service of Summons set forth in the Appendix of Forms attached to these rules. 
(f)(2) A defendant who timely returns a waiver is not required to respond to the complaint until 45 days after the date on which 
the request for waiver of service was mailed or delivered to the defendant, or 60 days after that date if addressed to a defendant 
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(f)(3) A defendant who waives service of a summons does not thereby waive any objectbn to venue or to the jurisdictbn of the 
court over the defendant. 
(f)(4) If a defendant refuses a request for waiver of service submitted in accordance with this rule, the court shall impose upon the 
defendant the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service. 
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Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an 
answer to a cross claim, if the answer contains a cross claim; a third party complaint, if a 
person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a 
third party answer, if a third party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, 
except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer. 
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless 
made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made 
in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with 
particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought. 
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order to show cause 
shall be made only for enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating an 
existing order. An application for an order to show cause must be supported by an affidavit 
sufficient to show cause to believe a party has violated a court order. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex 
parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after 
service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a 
memorandum in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, 
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters 
raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without 
leave of court. A party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of 
the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court. 
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application 
and a showing of good cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. 
Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted 
by the responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain 
a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any 
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated 
and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of 
contents and a table of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents 
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cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a 
"Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on 
which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the 
date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. 
If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing 
in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing 
shall be separately identified in the caption of the document containing the request. The court 
shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose 
of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in 
writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in 
the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any 
order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who 
made it with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, 
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within 
fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in 
conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five 
days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being 
served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate 
documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference. 
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Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader Is entitled to relief; and (2) a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or 
deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the 
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so 
much of it as Is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader Intends in good faith to controvert all the 
averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he 
may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he 
does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11 . 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration 
and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideratbn, fraud, 
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, 
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as If there had 
been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount 
of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is 
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(e)(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(e)(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or 
defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made 
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative 
statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based 
on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. 
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the 
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an 
organized association of persons that is made a party A party may raise an issue as to the 
legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a 
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity by specific negative averment, which shall 
include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue, the party relying on such 
capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the trial. 
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an 
adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party may 
be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true 
name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended 
accordingly. 
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet 
title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings may 
describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the 
complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions 
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed 
or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with 
particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on 
the trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver 
that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or 
quasi judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision 
without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be 
made specifically and with particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or 
decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of 
time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material 
matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically 
stated. 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state 
the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is 
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barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute 
specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise 
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is 
controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that 
the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance 
of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is 
sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its 
section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. 
The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(j)(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set 
forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of 
which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or 
spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such 
defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken. 
(j)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may 
allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to 
reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give 
in evidence the mitigating circumstances. 
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the 
judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint. 
(I) Allocation of fault. 
(I)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 8 
shall file: 
(l)(1)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and 
(l)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party, 
including name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is 
unknown, the party shall so state. 
(I)(2) The information specified in subsection (l)(1) must be included in the party's 
responsive pleading if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a 
reasonable time after the party discovers the factual and legal basis on which fault can be 
allocated but no later than the deadline specified in the discovery plan under Rule 26(f). The 
court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a party to file the information 
specified in subsection (l)(1) after the expiration of any period permitted by this rule, but in no 
event later than 90 days before trial. 
(I)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule. 
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Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers. 
(a)(1) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All pleadings and other 
papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the title 
of the action, the file number, the name of the pleading or other paper, and the name, if 
known, of the judge (and commissioner if applicable) to whom the case is assigned. 
(a)(2) In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties, but 
other pleadings and papers need only state the name of the first party on each side with an 
indication that there are other parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated 
by any name and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown 
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in the subject 
matter of the action." 
(a)(3) Every pleading and other paper filed with the court shall state in the top left hand 
corner of the first page the name, address, email address, telephone number and bar number 
of the attorney or party filing the paper, and, if filed by an attorney, the party for whom it is 
filed. The plaintiff shall file together with the complaint a completed cover sheet substantially 
similar in form and content to the cover sheet approved by the Judicial Council. The clerk may 
destroy the coversheet after recording the information it contains. 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All statements of claim or defense shall be made in 
numbered paragraphs. Each paragraph shall be limited as far as practicable to a single set of 
circumstances; and a paragraph may be adopted by reference in all succeeding pleadings. 
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than 
denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the 
clear presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a paper may be adopted by reference in 
a different part of the same or another paper. An exhibit to a paper is a part thereof for all 
purposes. 
(d) Paper format. All pleadings and other papers, other than exhibits and court-approved 
forms, shall be 81/4 inches wide x 11 inches long, on white background, with a top margin of 
not less than 2 inches, a right and left margin of not less than 1 inch and a bottom margin of 
not less than one-half inch, with text or images only on one side. All text or images shall be 
clearly legible, shall be double spaced, except for matters customarily single spaced, and 
shall not be smaller than 12-point size. 
(e) Signature line. The name of the person signing shall be typed or printed under that 
person's signature. If a paper is electronically signed, the paper shall contain the typed or 
printed name of the signer with or without a graphic signature. 
(f) Non-conforming papers. The clerk of the court shall examine all pleadings and other 
papers filed with the court. If they are not prepared in conformity with subdivisions (a) - (e), 
the clerk shall accept the filing but may require counsel to substitute properly prepared 
papers for nonconforming papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this 
rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve any party of 
any requirement of this rule. 
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(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper filed in any action 
or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or without notice, authorize a copy 
thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original. 
(h) No improper content. The court may strike and disregard all or any part of a pleading i 
or other paper that contains redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter. 
(i) Electronic papers. 
(i)(1) Any reference in these rules to a writing, recording or image includes the electronic 
version thereof. 
(i)(2) A paper electronically signed and filed is the original. 
(i)(3) An electronic copy of a paper, recording or image may be filed as though it were the 
original. Proof of the original, if necessary, is governed by the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(i)(4) An electronic copy of a paper shall conform to the format of the original. 
(i)(5) An electronically filed paper may contain links to other papers filed simultaneously or 
already on file with the court and to electronically published authority. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum H 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(a)(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e) and of any applicable statute, an 
action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at 
any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint 
permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal 
is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of 
any state an action based on or including the same claim. 
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal under 
paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request 
of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; or 
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has 
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, 
the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim 
can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in 
the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply 
with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of 
any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has 
completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer 
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that 
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the 
facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to 
render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the 
merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for 
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the 
merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The provisions of this rule 
apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall 
be made before a responsive pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of 
evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in 
any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same 
defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously 
dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff 
has complied with the order. 
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(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a party dismiss his 
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(1)(i) 
above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed 
in support of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the 
adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
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